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Rules: The Basis of Morality… ?
Paul M. Churchland
Most theories of moral knowledge, throughout history, have focused on behavior-
guiding rules. Those theories attempt to identify which rules are the morally valid
ones, and to identify the source or ground of that privileged set. The variations on
this theme are many and familiar. But there is a problem here. In fact, there are
several. First, many of the higher animals display a complex social order, one cru-
cial to their biological success, and the members of such species typically display
a sophisticated knowledge of what is and what is not acceptable social behavior
—but those creatures have no language at all. They are unable even to express a
single rule, let alone evaluate it for moral validity. Second, when we examine most
other kinds of behavioral skills—playing basketball, playing the piano, playing
chess—we discover that it is surpassingly difficult to articulate a set of discursive
rules, which, if followed, would produce a skilled athlete, pianist, or chess master.
And third, it would be physically impossible for a biological creature to identify
which of its myriad rule are relevant to a given situation, and then apply them, in
real time, in any case. All told, we would seem to need a new account of how our
moral knowledge is stored, accessed, and applied. The present paper explores the
potential, in these three regards, of recent alternative models from the computa-
tional neurosciences. The possibilities, it emerges, are considerable. 
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An old college teacher of mine once remarked to
me that “[a] philosopher’s fundamental mistakes
often appear on the very first page of his major
treatise”.  A possible  instance  of  this  eyebrow-
raising historical insight is the opening page of
the long section on moral philosophy found in
the prominent  undergraduate  philosophy text-
book entitled Introducing Philosophy—from Ox-
ford University Press, no less—skillfully edited
by  Robert C. Solomon (2001).  Solomon there
begins  his  broad survey of  this  profound and
important topic with the following explanatory
definition: 
The core of ethics is morality. Morality is
a set of fundamental rules that guide our
actions.
You may well wonder how there could be any-
thing controversial about this lucid statement,
for it does indeed capture the focus of at least
ninety percent of the moral philosophers’ writ-
ing in the Western traditions of  religious and
academic philosophy. It also captures the focus
of most contemporary moral discussions, even in
the marketplace and at the dinner table. We are
all  familiar  with,  and frequently  argue  about,
presumptive  “moral  rules,”  both  major  and
minor. We are all familiar with the competing
rationales  often  offered  in  explanation  of  the
presumed  authority  of  such  rules—that  they
come from God, or that they are part of the so-
cial contract, or that (when followed) they serve
to  maximize  collective  welfare,  and  so  forth.
How else should we focus and pursue our con-
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cern  with  moral  reality?  How else  might  one
even begin to address the topic? 
Hereby hangs a tale. For there are indeed
other ways of approaching the topic, both as en-
gaged citizens and as theorizing philosophers. A
monomaniacal  fixation  on  rules and  on  the
source of  their  authority may reflect a funda-
mental misconception of what is actually going
on inside successful moral agents when they en-
gage in typical moral cognition. It may misrep-
resent  the  underlying  nature  of  anyone’s  pre-
cious  moral  virtue.  It  may  misrepresent  the
learning process by which the moral virtues are
acquired. And it may misrepresent the ways in
which those virtues are actually exercised in our
day-to-day moral reasoning. 
Before  citing  historical/moral  authorities
in hopes of winning some credence for this ad-
mittedly  audacious  suggestion,  let  us  survey
some of the many non-moral, empirical, or fac-
tual reasons for entertaining an approach to un-
derstanding  morality  that  is  not  focused  on
rules. Such extra-moral reasons are not hard to
find. 
First, and perhaps foremost, rules in the
literal sense require a language in which they
can be expressed (and taught, and imposed, and
discussed, and modified). But none of the many
social creatures on this planet—excepting only
humans—possess any language at all, and cer-
tainly none equal to the task of expressing even
the  simplest  of  social  rules.  Chimpanzees,
wolves,  baboons,  and  lions,  for  example,  are
quite  innocent of  language,  and yet their  col-
lective behavior displays a complex social order
that the adult animals must respect—on pain of
punishment  or  retribution  from  their  peers—
and which the juveniles must learn to recognize,
understand,  and eventually  protect  with  their
own watchful behavior. They, too, live within a
more-or-less  stable  moral  order  that  serves
many if not most of the same functions served
by our own moral order. An adult chimp will
chide, sometimes severely, a juvenile chimp that
steals food from the hands of an infant chimp,
and will even return the stolen food to the ag-
grieved victim. Wolves, and even domestic dogs,
will offer comfort and solace to a wounded com-
patriot and will spring to defend it against fu-
ture  threats.  The  trust,  social  foresight,  and
mutual dependence displayed by a pack of lions
organizing and executing a hunt to bring down
a gazelle  is  a marvelous example of  collective
purposeful activity. And the subsequent sharing
of the spoils among all who participated in the
hunt  is  a  striking  example  of  distributive
justice, even if momentary squabbles occasion-
ally break out over access to the choicest bits of
the kill. (Nobody is morally perfect, especially a
tired and hungry lion.)
In  sum,  moral  perception,  moral  reason-
ing, moral activity, moral norms, moral defense,
and moral retribution all exist elsewhere in the
animal  kingdom (presumably for  many of  the
same reasons that they exist in us), but in none
of those other cases do language or discursive
rules play any role at all in the moral phenom-
ena at issue. The whole thing happens—most of
it, anyway—but without language. 
So what is going on? What is it that regu-
lates or steers their behavior, if not rules? Be-
fore  canvassing  possible  answers  to  this  ques-
tion, let  us ponder some additional data, this
time concerning  humans.  Adult  humans occa-
sionally  fall  victim to something  called  global
aphasia, a stroke-induced brain malady in which
the cortical areas responsible for the manipula-
tion,  production,  and  comprehension  of  lan-
guage—in any form: spoken, written, or printed
—are totally destroyed. The loss of this critic-
ally  important  neuronal  machinery  (roughly,
Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area, typically on
the  left  side  of  the  brain)  leaves  the  victim
without any capacity to formulate, process, or
comprehend  any  linguistic  structures  whatso-
ever. That dimension of cognitive representation
is  now  completely  out  of  business.  There  is
nothing wrong with the victim’s sensory inputs
or motor outputs; these peripheral systems re-
main entirely  functional.  The cognitive  deficit
lies deeper. The capacity for even  forming lin-
guistically structured thoughts has disappeared
entirely.  The victim cannot formulate or com-
prehend any declarative sentence, nor any inter-
rogative sentence, nor any imperative sentence,
nor any rule. These elements, so familiar to the
rest of us, no longer play any role in their cog-
nitive lives.
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And yet their cognitive lives in other re-
spects  remain  surprisingly  unaffected,  despite
this disaster where specifically  linguistic struc-
tures  are  concerned.  Some three  decades  ago,
we had such a left-brain stroke victim in our
own extended family.  Aunt Betty,  as  she was
fondly  called,  could  still  drive  a  car  around
town, shop for the groceries, cook a dinner, and
watch a football game on TV with understand-
ing and enjoyment. More to the point, her basic
trust in other humans, and her own basic trust-
worthiness, were quite intact. During visits, her
comprehension of the moral flux around her, es-
pecially where the adventures and interactions
of  our  youngish  children  were  concerned,
seemed quite undiminished, as were her skills in
providing comfort for the teary-eyed and fair-
ness  in  the  distribution  of  small  pastries  at
lunch. Her moral cognition was up and running
smoothly,  evidently,  much  as  before—but
without the benefit of any rules to tell her what
to do. She could no longer comprehend or even
contemplate them, and yet somehow, she didn’t
need them.
Another illustration of  the  superfluity of
rules to moral character emerged, without warn-
ing and to much amusement, in an interview of
a  moderately  charming  Georgia  Congressman
on the TV comedy show  The Colbert  Report.
The topic of their extended discussion was a re-
cent higher-court ban on the public display of
the Judeo-Christian Ten Commandments in the
foyer  of  a  Louisiana  courthouse,  and  the
justice/injustice  of  their  subsequent  court-
ordered  removal  from that  public  venue.  The
congressman,  a  Mr.  Lynn  Westmoreland,  was
defending  their  public,  cast-bronze-on-granite
display  on  a  variety  of  grounds,  but  most
trenchantly  on  the  grounds  that,  collectively,
those ten rules constitute the very foundation of
our morality, insofar as we have any morality.
Their public display, therefore, could only serve
to enhance the level of individual morality.
Sensing  an  opportunity,  Steven  Colbert
nodded  his  presumptive  assent  to  this  claim,
and  asked  his  guest,  “Could  you  please  cite
them  for  us,  congressman?”  Westmoreland,
plainly  taken  aback  by  the  request,  gamely
began, “Don’t lie, . . . don’t steal, . . . don’t kill,
. . .” as Colbert, with his eyebrows raised in ex-
pectation, held up first one finger in response,
then two, then three. After an awkward pause
at that point, the congressman, who had plainly
drawn a blank beyond those three, bravely and
with  evident  honesty  said,  “No,  I’m  sorry.  I
can’t  name them all”.  My immediate reaction
(oh, alright, my second) was sympathy for the
congressman, because I don’t think I could have
named them all, either. At which point Colbert
ostentatiously thanked his guest for his wisdom
and brought the interview, before a large audi-
ence, to an uproariously received and laughter-
filled conclusion.
The comedic point was plain enough and
doesn’t need any further elaboration from me.
But there is a deeper lesson to be drawn from
this exchange. The fact is, the congressman is
probably as good an example of worthy moral
character as one is likely to encounter at one’s
local post office or grocery store. After all, he
inspired  sufficient  public  trust  to  get  himself
elected,  and  he  thinks  morality  important
enough to defend it, with some passion and re-
sourcefulness, on television. He is a presumptive
example of a conscientious man with a morally
worthy character.  But if  he is,  these welcome
virtues  are  clearly  not owed  to  his  carrying
around, in memory, a specific list of discursive
rules,  rules  at  his  immediate  command,  rules
that he literally consults in order to guide his
ongoing  social  behavior.  He  could  remember
only three of the ten “commandments” at issue,
and, if you check the bible, he didn’t get two of
those three quite right in any case.  If  we are
looking (and we are) for an explanation of the
actual ground or source of people’s moral beha-
vior,  the proposal  that we are all  following a
specific and finite set of discursive rules in order
to  produce  that  behavior  is  starting  to  look
strained and threadbare, to put it mildly.
Before addressing an alternative explana-
tion, let us note one further domain of empirical
evidence,  relevant  to our issue concerning the
role of rules. Moral expertise is among the most
precious of our human virtues, but it is not the
only one. There are many other domains of ex-
pertise.  Consider  the  consummate  skills  dis-
played by a concert pianist, or an all-star bas-
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ketball  player,  or  a  grandmaster  chess  cham-
pion. In these cases, too, the specific expertise
at issue is acquired only slowly, with much prac-
tice sustained over a period of years. And here
also,  the expertise  displayed far  exceeds what
might possibly be captured in a set of discursive
rules  consciously  followed,  on  a  second-by-
second basis, by the skilled individuals at issue.
Such  skills  are  deeply  inarticulate  in  the
straightforward sense that the expert who pos-
sesses them is unable to simply tell an aspiring
novice what to do so as to be an expert pianist,
an  effective  point  guard,  or  a  skilled  chess
player. The knowledge necessary clearly cannot
be conveyed in that fashion. The skills cited are
all  cases of knowing  how rather than cases of
knowing  that.  Acquiring  them  takes  a  lot  of
time and a lot of practice.
To be sure, the point-guard can instruct
the novice,  “When you get possession of  the
ball at your end, dribble it down the floor to-
ward  the  opposition’s  basket,  and  when  the
defense  starts  to  resist,  pass  the  ball  to
whichever  of  your  teammates  has  the  best
chance of sinking a shot.” But this rule, even
if  it  is  tatooed on the novice’s  forearm, will
hardly  make  him  an  effective  player.  It
doesn’t tell him how to dribble effectively, nor
could  any  other  list  of  rules.  It  doesn’t  tell
him  how  to  recognize a  teammate’s  fleeting
opportunity to take a high-percentage shot, or
perhaps set one up for yet a third player. It
doesn’t tell him how to pass the ball so as to
avoid interception, or how to  deceive the de-
fense with various kinds of fakes and feints. It
doesn’t  even address the issue of how to ex-
ecute  any  one  of  the  dozen  or  so  different
kinds of shots he himself might have to take,
or when to take them. It doesn’t tell him .01
percent  of  what  he  needs  to  know  to  be  a
skilled  player.  And  even  if  he  did  somehow
memorize 10,000 rules on all of these diverse
topics,  he couldn’t  possibly recall,  from that
vast store, exactly the rule relevant at any in-
stant and then apply it swiftly enough to steer
his ongoing play. The game unfolds much too
quickly for that plodding strategy to be effect-
ive. Something else is going on inside the bas-
ketball player’s head. Something else entirely.
The  game  of  chess  is  much  slower,  of
course,  and simpler  too.  But the same lesson
emerges here as well,  although from an unex-
pected direction. Unlike the basketball case, and
because  of  the  discreteness  and  comparative
simplicity of chess, computer programmers have
indeed  written  computer  programs—that  is,
large sets  of  literal  rules  for  the computer  to
consult  and  follow— that  will  enable  a  com-
puter to play a creditable game of competitive
chess.  These  programs  were  common  by  the
early 1980s, and they were competent enough to
defeat non-expert human chess players (such as
me) quite regularly. 
The computer-guiding  rules  were written
so as to address any arbitrary configuration of
chess pieces on the board, as might emerge in
the course of a game, and to evaluate,  in se-
quence, the cost or benefit of each of the per-
haps thirty legal moves (or something in that
neighborhood—it  will  vary)  then  available  to
the  computer.  To  be  at  all  effective,  this
strategy requires  that  the computer  also  con-
siders  the  potential  cost/benefit  (to  the  com-
puter)  of  its  opponent’s  possible  responses to
each of  those contemplated moves.  Each such
response would of course present the computer
with a new set  of  possible  moves of  its  own,
each  requiring  evaluation,  and  so  on,  for  an-
other cycle of possible moves-and-responses. If
the computer is to look ahead in this fashion for
only two cycles of play, it will already be evalu-
ating something like (30 × 30) × (30 × 30) =
810,000  or  almost  a  million  possible  move-se-
quences! And if it presumes to look forward, in
this brute-force evaluative fashion, a mere  four
cycles  of  play,  its  task explodes to examining
the cost/benefit ratio for almost a trillion pos-
sible move-sequences. 
Now you and I  could never  hope to ex-
ecute a game-strategy of this kind, but a com-
puter can, although just barely. Let us assume
that  the  computer’s  central  processing  unit
(CPU) has a clock-frequency of, say, 100 Mega-
hertz ( = 100 million elementary computations
per  second),  a  fairly  modest  machine,  these
days. Such a computer will take only (1 trillion
moves to be evaluated) / (100 million evals/sec)
= 10,000 seconds, or about three hours to com-
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plete its evaluation of four cycles of play, assum-
ing  that  the  cost/benefit  estimate  for  each
move-sequence (a comparatively simple matter)
can be calculated in a single elementary compu-
tation. 
“But  this  is  still  ridiculous,”  you  might
say. “Three  hours of mulling per turn!? That’s
not  even  legal.  And  looking  ahead  only  four
move-cycles? That’s not going to defeat a really
good human chess player.” And you would be
right. But in fact, some artful pruning of the
decision-tree constructed by the computer’s pro-
gram  (e.g.,  through  ignoring  some  possible
moves, on both sides, that are likely to be irrel-
evant) will substantially reduce the combinator-
ial explosion in the number of moves that need
to be evaluated.  This  can reduce the time of
evaluation  from three  hours  to  perhaps  three
minutes,  though  at  some  cost  to  security.  A
somewhat faster CPU might further reduce it to
less than three seconds. And the occasional de-
ployment of a slightly more penetrating five or
six-cycle lookahead evaluation for the occasional
moves  of  potentially  great  value,  positive  or
negative, can add some deeper, if localized, in-
sight without adding too much in the way of a
computational burden. In these ways the pro-
grammed  computer  can  be  brought  into  the
range of real-time chess competence, even excel-
lence. 
Still,  it  is  worth  remarking  that  it  took
over three decades of program and computer de-
velopment before a chess-playing computer was
finally able to defeat a world-champion human
chess  master.  The Russian  master  Gary  Kas-
parov (poor devil) finally went down to an IBM
monster computer named “Deep Blue” in 1997,
to  the  celebration  of  nerds  and  technophiles
everywhere (Campbell et al. 2002). That is, the
gross strategy of applying discursive rules, again
and again at blistering speeds, finally paid off.
But it did so only because the computer CPU’s
clock-speed was roughly a million times faster
than  any  cyclic  process  in  a  human  brain
(which maxes out at a mere one hundred cycles
per  second)  and  only  because  the  conduction
velocity of the electrical signals inside the com-
puter (almost the speed of light) was roughly a
million times faster than the conduction velo-
city in a human nerve fiber (about the speed of
a fast bicycle rider). These make the computer
about (a million times a million = ) a  trillion
times faster than we are. Without these singular
and  superhuman physical advantages, the com-
puter and its list of rules—its program—would
be dead in the water. And so would we humans,
if  the  rule-based  strategy  were  how  human
chess-playing  competence  is  grounded.  But
plainly it is not. It couldn’t possibly be. Some-
thing else is going on inside the human chess-
master’s head. Something else entirely.
2 An alternative account of moral skill
We  have  only  recently  begun  to  understand
what that “something else” is. It has to do with
the peculiar way the brain is wired up at the
level of its many billions of neurons. It also has
to do with the very different style of representa-
tion and computation that this peculiar pattern
of connectivity makes possible. The basics are
quite easily grasped, so without further ado, let
us place them before you.
The first difference between a conventional
digital  computer and a biological brain is  the
way in which the brain  represents the fleeting
states of the world around it. The retinal sur-
face at the back of your eye, for example, rep-
resents  the  scene currently before  you with a
pattern of simultaneous (repeat: simultaneous)
activation or excitation levels across the entire
population of rod- and cone-cells spread across
that  light-sensitive  surface.  Notice  that  this
style  of  representation  is  entirely  familiar  to
you. You confront an example of it every time
you watch television. Your TV screen represents
your nightly news anchor’s face, for example, by
a specific pattern of brightness levels (“activa-
tion” levels) across the entire population of tiny
pixels that make up the screen. Those pixels are
always there. (Tiptoe up to the screen and take
a closer look.) What changes from image to im-
age is the pattern of brightness levels that those
unmoving  pixels  collectively  assume.  Change
the pattern and you change the image.
It is the same story with any specialized
population of neurons, such as the retina in the
eye, the visual cortex at the back of the brain,
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the cochlea of the inner ear, the auditory cor-
tex, the olfactory cortex, the somatosensory cor-
tex, and so on and so on. All of these neuronal
areas, and many others, are specialized for the
representation of  some aspect  or other of  the
reality around us: sights, sounds, odors, tactile
and motor events, even features of social reality,
such as facial expressions. These neuronal activ-
ation-patterns  need  not  be  literal  pictures of
reality, as they happen to be in the special case
of the eye’s retinal neurons. But they are  rep-
resentations of  the  fine-grained  structure  of
some aspect of reality even so, for each activa-
tion-pattern contains  an  enormous  amount  of
information about the external feature of reality
that,  via  the  senses  and  internal  brain  path-
ways, ultimately produced it. 
Just  how much information is worth not-
ing.  The  retina  contains  roughly  100  million
light-sensitive rods and cones. (In modern elec-
tronic camera-speak, it has a rating of one hun-
dred megapixels. In other words, your humble
retina still has  ten times the resolution of the
best  available  commercial  cameras.)  Compare
this to the paltry representational  power of  a
typical computer’s CPU: it might represent at
most a mere 8 bits at a time, if  it  is  an old
model, but more likely 16 bits or 32 bits for a
current machine, or perhaps 64 or 128 bits for a
really high-end machine. Pitiful!  Even an old-
fashioned  TV  screen  simultaneously  activates
about 200,000 pixels, and an HDTV will have
over  two-thirds  of  a  million  (1,080  ×  640  =
691,200  pixels).  Much  better.  But  the  retina,
and any other specialized population of neurons
tucked away somewhere in the brain, will have
roughly  100  million  simultaneously  activated
pixels.  Downright  excellent.  Moreover,  these
pixels—the individual neurons themselves—are
not limited to being either on or off (i.e., to dis-
playing a one or a zero), as with the elements in
a computer’s CPU. Biological pixels can display
a  smooth variety  of  different  excitation  levels
between the extremes of 0 percent and 100 per-
cent activation. This smooth variation (as op-
posed to the discrete on/off coding of a com-
puter’s  bit-register)  increases  the  information-
carrying capacity of the overall population dra-
matically. In all, the representational technique
deployed in biological brains—called population
coding because it uses the entire population of
neurons  simultaneously—is  an  extraordinarily
effective technique.
The  brain’s  computational technique,
which dovetails sweetly with its representational
style,  is  even  more  impressive.  (As  with  any
computer,  a  computational  operation  in  the
brain  consists  in  its  transforming some  input
representation into some output representation.)
Recall that any given representation within the
brain  typically  involves  many  millions  of  ele-
ments.  This  poses  a  prima  facie  problem,
namely, how to deal, swiftly, with so many ele-
ments.  Fortunately,  what  the  brain  cannot
spread out over  time—as we noted above, it is
far too slow to use that strategy—it spreads out
over  space.  It performs its distinct elementary
computations, many trillions of them, each one
at a distinct micro-place in the brain, but all of
them at the  same time. Let us explain with a
picture so you can see the point at a glance.
At  the  bottom of  figure  1 is  a  cartoon
population  of  many neurons—retinal  neurons,
let us suppose. As you can see, they are cur-
rently  representing  a human face,  evidently  a
happy one. But if the rest of the brain is to re-
cognize the specific emotional state implicit in
that sensory image, it must process the informa-
tion therein contained so as to activate a spe-
cific  pattern  within  the  secondary  patch  of
neurons just above it. That second population,
let us further suppose, has the proprietary job
of representing any one of a range of possible
emotions,  such  as  happiness,  sadness,  anger,
fear,  boredom,  and  so  forth.  The  system
achieves this aim by sending the entire retinal
activation-pattern upward via a large number of
signal-carrying axonal fibers, each one of which
branches at its upper end to make fully eighty
synaptic connections with the neurons at  this
second layer. (Only some of these axonal fibers
are here displayed, so as to avoid an impenet-
rable clutter in the diagram. But every retinal
neuron sends an axon upward.)
When  the  original  retinal  activation-pat-
tern reaches the second layer of emotion-coding
neurons,  you  can  see  that  it  is  forced  to  go
through the intervening filter of (4,096 axons ×
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80 end-branches each = 327,680) almost a third
of a million synapses, all at the same time. Each
synaptic  connection  magnifies,  or  muffles,  its
own tiny part of the incoming retinal pattern,
so as collectively to stimulate a new activation-
pattern across the second layer of neurons. That
new  pattern  is  a  representation  of  a  specific
emotion, in this case, happiness. The third and
final layer of this neural network has the job of
discriminating  these  new  80-element  patterns,
one from another, so as to activate a single cell
that  codes  specifically  for  the  emotion  still
opaquely represented at the second population.
That is achieved by tuning a further population
of synaptic connections from every cell in the
middle layer to each of the five cells in the final
layer. In all, what was only implicit in the ori-
ginal  retinal  activation-pattern  (mostly  in  the
mouth and eyebrows) is now represented  expli-
citly in the top-most activation-pattern across
the five cells there located.
This trick is swiftly turned by the special
configuration of the various strengths of each of
the intervening  synaptic  connections.  Some of
them are very large and have a major impact in
exciting the upper-level neuron to which it is at-
tached,  even  for  a  fairly  weak  signal  arriving
from its retinal cell. Other connections are quite
small and have very little excitatory impact on
the  receiving  cell,  even  if  the  arriving  retinal
signal  is  fairly  strong.  Collectively,  those
327,680  synaptic  connections  have  been  care-
fully adjusted or tuned, by prior learning, to be
maximally and selectively sensitive to just those
aspects of any face image that convey informa-
tion about the five emotions mentioned earlier,
and to be “blind” to anything else. The complex
“pattern  transformation”  they  effect  plainly
loses an awful lot of information contained in
the original (retinal) representation. Indeed, it
loses most of it. But it does succeed in making
explicit  the  specifically  emotional  information
that this little three-layer “neural network” was
designed to detect.
This style of computation is called Parallel
Distributed  Processing  (PDP),  and  it  is  your
brain’s principal mode of doing business on any
topic. Even in this cartoon example, you can see
some of the dramatic advantages it has over the
“serial” processing used in a digital computer. A
typical  8-bit  CPU  has  a  population  of  only
eight representational cells at work at any given
instant,  compared  to  fully  4,096  just  for  the
sensory layer  of  our little  cartoon neural  net-
work. The CPU performs only eight elementary
transformations  at  a  time,  as  opposed  to
327,680 for the neural network, one for each of
its 327,680 synaptic connections. When we con-
sider the human brain as a whole instead of the
tiny cartoon network above, we are looking at a
system that  contains  roughly  a  thousand dis-
tinct neuronal populations of the same size as
the human retina, all of them interconnected in
the same fashion as in the cartoon. This gives
us (1,000 specialized populations × 100 million
neurons per population = ) a total of 100  bil-
lion neurons in the brain as a whole. As well,
the total number of synaptic  connections there
reaches  more  than  100  trillion,  each  one  of
which can perform its proprietary magnification
or minification of its arriving axonal message at
the very same time as every other. Accordingly,
the brain doesn’t have to do these elementary
computations in laborious temporal sequence in
the fashion of a digital computer. As we saw, a
PDP network is capable of pulling out subtle
and sophisticated  information  from a  gigantic
sensory  representation  all  in  one  fell  swoop.
That is the take-home lesson of our cartoon net-
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work. The digital/serial CPU is doomed to be a
comparative dunce in that regard, however art-
ful may be the rules that make up its computer
program. They simply take too long to apply. 
Enough  of  the  numbers.  What  wants  re-
membering in what follows is the holistic charac-
ter of the brain’s representational and computa-
tional activities, a high-volume character that al-
lows the brain to make penetrating interpreta-
tions of highly complex sensory situations in the
twinkling of an eye. You are of course intimately
familiar with this style of cognition: you use it all
the time. Every time you recognize frustration in
someone’s face, evasion in someone’s voice, hostil-
ity in someone’s gesture, sympathy in someone’s
expression, or uncertainty in someone’s reply, a
larger version of the neuronal mechanism in figure
1 has made that subtle information almost in-
stantly available to you. 
Now,  however,  you  know  how:  massively
parallel processing in a massively parallel neural
network. Or, to put it  more cautiously, almost
three  decades  of  exploring  the  computational
properties  of  artificial  neural  networks,  and al-
most three decades of experimenting on the activ-
ities  of  biological  neural  networks  have  left  us
with the hypothesis on display above as the best
hypothesis currently available for how the brain
both represents and processes information about
the world.  No doubt,  the  special  network pro-
cessor inside you, the one that is responsible for
filtering  out  specifically  emotional  information,
has more than the mere two layers depicted in
our  cartoon.  In  fact,  anatomical  data  suggests
that your version of that network has the retinal
information climb through four  or  five  distinct
neuronal  layers  before  reaching  the  relevant
layer(s), deep in the brain, that explicitly registers
the emotional information at issue. The original
retinal information will thus have to go through
four  or  five  distinct  layers  of  synaptic
filters/transformers before the emotional informa-
tion  is  successfully  isolated  and identified.  But
that  still  gives  us  the  capacity  for  recognizing
emotions in less than a few tenths of a second.
(The several neuronal layers involved are only ten
milliseconds apart.) On matters like this, we are
fast, at least when our myriad synaptic connec-
tions have been appropriately tuned up.
The PDP hypothesis also gives us the best
available  account  of  how  that  synaptic  tuning
takes place, that is, of how the brain learns. Spe-
cifically, the size or “weight” of the brain’s many
transforming synapses  changes over time in re-
sponse to the external patterns that it repeatedly
encounters in experience. The overall configura-
tion of those synaptic connections and their ad-
justable weights is gradually shaped by the recur-
ring themes, properties, structures, behaviors, di-
lemmas, and rewards that the world throws at
them.  The  resulting  configuration  of  synaptic
weights is thus made selectively sensitive to—one
might indeed say  tuned to—the important  fea-
tures  of  the  typical  environment  in  which  the
creature lives. In our case, that environment in-
cludes other people, and the pre-existing structure
of mutual interaction and social commerce—the
moral  order—in  which  they  live.  Learning  the
general structure of that pre-existing social space,
learning to recognize the current position of one-
self and others within it, and learning to navigate
that abstract space without personal or social dis-
asters  are among the most important  things a
normal human will ever learn. 
It takes time, of course. An infant, before
his first birthday, can distinguish between sad-
ness  and  happiness,  but  little  else.  A  grade-
school child can pick up on most of the more
subtle emotional flavors listed three paragraphs
ago,  though probably only in  the behavior  of
young children  like  themselves.  But  a  normal
adult can detect all of those flavors, and more,
quickly and reliably, as displayed by almost any
person she may encounter.  (Only psychopaths
defeat us, and that’s because they have deviant
or truncated emotional profiles.)
Withal, learning to read emotions is only a
part of the perceptual and interpretational skills
that normal humans acquire. People also learn to
pick up on people’s background desires and their
current  practical  purposes.  We  learn  to  divine
people’s  background  beliefs and  the  current
palette  of  factual information that is  (or isn’t)
available to them. We learn to recognize who is
bright and who is dull, who is kind and who is
mean, and who has real social skills and who is a
fumbling jerk. Finally, we learn to do things. We
learn how to win the trust of others, and how to
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maintain it through thick and thin. We learn how
to  engage  in  cooperative  endeavors  and  to  do
what others rightfully expect of us. We learn to
see social trouble coming and to head it off art-
fully. And we learn to apologize for and to recover
from our own inevitable social mistakes. 
These skills of moral cognitive  output (i.e.,
our moral behavior) are embodied in the same
sorts of many-layered neural networks that sus-
tain moral cognitive input (i.e., our moral percep-
tion). The diverse cognitive interpretations pro-
duced by our capacity for moral perceptions are
swiftly and smoothly transformed—again by a se-
quence  of  well-trained  synaptic  filters/trans-
formers—into  patterns  of  excitation  across  our
motor neurons (which project to and activate the
body’s muscles) and thereby into overt social be-
haviors, behaviors that are appropriate in light of
the moral interpretations that produced them. Or
at least,  they will  be appropriate if  our moral
education has been effective.
This weave of perceptual, cognitive, and ex-
ecutive skills is all rooted in, and managed by, the
intricately tuned synaptic connections that inter-
vene between hundreds of distinct neuronal popu-
lations, each of which has the job of representing
some proprietary aspect of human psychological
and social  reality.  That precious and hard-won
configuration of synaptic weights literally consti-
tutes the social and moral  wisdom that one has
managed to acquire. It embodies the unique pro-
file of one’s moral  character: it dictates how we
see the social world around us, and it dictates our
every move within it. It is not an exaggeration to
say that it dictates who we are. If our character
needs  changing  or  correcting,  it  is  our  myriad
synapses that need to be reconfigured, at least in
minor and perhaps in major ways. In all of these
matters, then, don’t think  rules. Think informa-
tion-transforming  configurations  of  synaptic
weights,  for  it  is  they  that  are  doing  the  real
work. 
3 Reconceiving moral competence in 
non-classical terms
What  is that  “real  work”? If  the  neural  net-
works that make up our brains are not in the
business of applying rules, vast libraries-full of
them, just what business  are they engaged in?
How should we think of what they are doing, if
not as administering rules? What is the positive
alternative  to  this  traditional  construal,  ex-
pressed in non-technical language? 
What those networks are doing is (trying
to) interpret any new experience or situation as
being an instance of some prior category that
the brain already understands. They are trying
to assimilate each new social/moral situation to
an already grasped prototype situation, a tem-
plate or prototype that has been incrementally
created by the brain’s prior experience with its
surrounding social/moral reality. They are try-
ing to grasp each of the endless novelties that
they encounter as being just a modified case of
some kind-of-thing that they have already en-
countered  many  times,  and  with  which  they
have already become familiar. They are trying
to interpret the fleeting here-and-now (which is
always specific) in terms of their comparatively
enduring  background  concepts  (which  are  al-
ways general). They are trying to identify which
of their various categories, categories that past
experience has constructed for them, is the one
into  which  their  current  experience  fits  most
closely and most accurately. In sum, they are
trying to apply their acquired conceptual and
practical wisdom to their current situation.
Why should they, or rather, you, be trying
to do that? For the very good reason that your
acquired  concepts  or  prototypes  are  precisely
what  contains  your  accumulated  information
about the world, information beyond what your
current and highly specific experience happens
to make evident. Those abstract prototypes con-
tain  presumptive  information  about  the  wide
range of features that any instance of an applied
concept  can  typically  be  expected  to  display,
about the wide range of  relations it will typic-
ally  bear  to  other  things,  about  the  ways  in
which  it  will  typically  unfold  or  behave over
time, and about the ways in which it can typic-
ally be controlled or  steered. That is the point,
after all, of having a conceptual framework in
the first  place.  It  embodies  your accumulated
understanding  of  the  world’s  enduring  back-
ground structure, your grasp of the unchanging
background framework within which the ephem-
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eral and the changeable are always constrained
to unfold. 
Consider, for an example of moral percep-
tion in particular, the arrival of lunchtime in a
typical elementary-school classroom. Every stu-
dent retrieves a paper-bag lunch from the cloak-
room and settles down to consume its contents.
You are one of those students and, while eating,
you perceive Johnny surreptitiously attempt to
remove a  banana from the  lunch-bag next  to
Michael. On the face of it, you are witnessing a
case  of  theft.  And that  interpretation  implies
many things:  that the banana belongs to Mi-
chael, that Michael will be seriously aggrieved
when he discovers Johnny’s affront, that Johnny
has inadequate self-control, that a noisy conflict
will ensue if events are left to themselves, and
so on and so on. This situation, as described,
warrants some immediate intervention.
Most obviously, you might just openly be-
rate Johnny in front of the other students. Or,
more boldly, you might seize the banana from
Johnny and quietly return it to Michael. Or you
might  call  the  teacher  and  rat  Johnny  out.
These hardly exhaust your possible  responses,
but they are all typical sorts of responses to a
typical sort of problem, and which response you
choose will depend on contextual factors such as
how big and mean Johnny is, how susceptible
he is to collective disapproval, and how reliable
the teacher is at dispensing justice. Perhaps the
first path is the best response, with the second
and third left as backups if the first path fails
to return the situation to a just equilibrium. 
And so that is what you do: berate him on
the spot. All within a second of witnessing the
presumed  theft.  Because  your  eight-year-old
brain  is  already keenly  tuned to that  sort  of
possibility and to thousands of other social pos-
sibilities as well. Given your well-trained neural
networks, it takes only the external perceptual
situation itself to provoke the interpretation of
theft. And it takes only that conceptual inter-
pretation  itself,  in  the  context  of  one’s  ever-
present character and background information,
to activate your overt social response. 
Your interpretation, of course, might be in-
correct.  Perhaps Johnny was just trying to re-
trieve his own banana, earlier stolen by the avari-
cious  Michael.  Perhaps  your  openly  berating
Johnny was inappropriate, since everyone in the
class except you witnessed Michael’s earlier theft
but was too frightened of Michael to do anything
about it. If so, Johnny has now been victimized
twice over, once by Michael and once by you.
To be sure, there are many other convoluted
possibilities, in addition to or beyond this one.
But they are increasingly unlikely, compared to
your first take on the situation. This is why your
brain fell so swiftly and easily into that straight-
forward interpretation: theft is the simplest, most
obvious, most probable explanation of what you
have actually seen, and that’s why it’s the explan-
ation that the brain tries first. Furthermore, once
that explanatory assumption is in place, an im-
mediate attempt at restitution is the most natural
expression of your antecedent character and your
acquired social skills. 
What  is  impressive  here  is  not  just  the
swiftness with which your cognitive resources get
tapped. It is the enormous  range of alternative
possibilities to which your brain is/was no less
prepared to respond, and with equal swiftness, in-
sight,  and  know-how.  If,  instead  of  a  banana
theft, you had witnessed Mary accidentally press
her hand against the point of a newly sharpened
pencil,  your  recognition  of  her  pain  and  your
comforting  response  would  have  been  just  as
quick.  If  you saw the class’s  pet rabbit  escape
from its (poorly locked) cage, you would know to
retrieve it and return it to its proper home. If you
had  turned  to  see  a  small  fire  blazing  in  the
classroom’s bookcase-corner library, with Johnny
(him again!)  slipping  a  plastic  lighter  into  his
pocket, you would grasp the significance of the
event  instantly  and let  out  a  loud warning  to
everyone in  the  room.  If  (here  we deliberately
choose something unlikely) Superman, with cape
swirling, then bursts through the open classroom
window and asks, “Which way did the fire-bug
go?!,” you would know to point to Johnny’s flee-
ing backside as he hightails it out the classroom
door. If . . . if . . . if . . . for a thousand thousand
“ifs”  and  more,  even  your  eight-year-old  self
would  be  competent  to  recognize  the  situation
and to respond to it swiftly and appropriately. 
This extraordinary breadth of capacity is a
consequence,  in  part,  of  the  combinatorics of
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the already large number of neurons the brain
uses to represent any sort of social situation. It
is the same trick, once again, used by your tele-
vision screen, in order to display an almost end-
less variety of possible pictures, despite a (large
but) finite set of pixels with which to portray
them. The retina of the eye uses the same trick,
recall,  but boasts  many more “pixels” than a
TV screen. Your perceptual capacities, accord-
ingly, far exceed the modest range of that famil-
iar technology. 
Of course,  simply representing something
at the perceptual level does not mean that you
understand it, and that is strictly what concerns
us here. To understand a perceptual input is, as
we saw above,  to  assimilate  it  to  one  of  the
brain’s  learned  prototype situations,  to  one  of
the standard, recurring, well-patterned kind of
circumstances  that  one’s  past  experience  has
impressed upon your memory and your habits
of  behavior.  That  memory  and  those  habits,
you will recall, are a matter of the acquired con-
figuration  of  the  brain’s  synaptic  connections
and their synaptic strengths or “weights.” For it
is  those collective synaptic  “filters” or “trans-
formers”—the ones that intervene between each
of  the  brain’s  many reality-portraying  neuron
populations— that steer  the initial  perceptual
representations  into  the  higher-level  prototype
patterns that fit those percepts most closely.
Look again at the toy network of figure 1
and note that its 327,680 synaptic connections
were there adequate to steer a wide variety of
possible input face images into one or other of
exactly five emotional prototypes. If we suppose
that this ratio (i.e., 327,680 synapses for every
five  categorial  prototypes)  is  roughly  typical,
then a brain like yours, with 100  trillion syn-
aptic connections, should be able to learn, and
to  deploy  immediately  (when  appropriate),
something in the neighborhood of (5 / 327,680)
× 100 trillion = 1.5 billion distinct categorical
prototypes!  Now,  presumably  we  don’t  have
quite that many distinct categories awaiting ac-
tivation. That number is best viewed as a theor-
etical  upper limit  on  what  we might  achieve.
But in light of how our cognitive systems evid-
ently do their jobs, it is small wonder that even
your grade-school self  is  hair-trigger ready for
such an astonishing range of  situations, social
and otherwise—and ready,  note well,  with an
astonishing range of understanding and relevant
skills.
4 Moral conflict and moral reasoning
Alas, our cognitive systems don’t always work
perfectly.  Sometimes  we misinterpret  what we
are seeing and hearing. That is, sometimes we
assimilate  the  case  at  hand to  a  category  or
prototype  of  which  it  is  not  an  instance,  to
which it positively does not belong. When that
happens, you become the victim of the entire
family of expected features, relations, develop-
mental  profile,  and  presumptively  appropriate
behavioral  responses  that  automatically  come
with that prototype, but that fail to accurately
characterize or suit the case at hand. Some di-
mensions  of  the  activated  prototype  may  fit
(that’s why you deployed it in the first place),
but others do not, as you slowly come to appre-
ciate. As the case before you unfolds, and per-
haps as you learn more about its initial stages,
your prototype-driven expectations are violated
and your cognitive dissonance grows. You have
somehow failed to understand the situation cor-
rectly.
At some point, the accumulated new input
or  evidence  may  be  sufficient  to  kick  your
brain’s  activational  activity  out of  the  proto-
type-category that initially captured it and into
a different and more appropriate prototype, one
whose overall profile finally does fit the case at
hand. At that point you may have the familiar
“click” experience, where the problematic case
suddenly re-presents itself in a new and coher-
ent  light,  and you think to yourself,  “Oh my
god, I misunderstood what was happening.” You
may  then  struggle  to  repair  the  social/moral
damage that your automatic but ultimately in-
apt behavior may have produced.
This happens to all of us, and quite often.
It reflects the fact that our moral cognition is
not  infallible.  Happily,  such  mistakes  can  be
corrected, and regularly they are, sometimes by
oneself and sometimes with the help of others.
Unhappily,  sometimes  they  are  not  corrected.
We are all familiar with people who have too
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quickly  taken  a  superficial  interpretation  of
some social/moral issue and then stubbornly re-
fuse to respond to, or even to see, its failures to
capture adequately the social/moral complexit-
ies that the issue presents. 
When this happens, we have a typical case
of  moral  conflict.  If  the  issue  is  pressing,  we
may  begin  a  round  of  moral  reasoning  and
moral argument with the person or persons who
take the competing interpretation of the issue,
and  who  propose  a  problematic  response  or
policy in light of it. Such arguments, it must be
admitted,  often  begin  with  both  sides  citing
some favored “moral” or other, a rule that sup-
posedly compels us to take their response to the
situation or to embrace their policy recommend-
ation. But this rarely settles the conflict, since
the real disagreement is usually about how we
should interpret the situation in the first place. 
Classic examples are right in front of us.
The public debate over abortion involves a pre-
sumptive conflict between the rule “Any inno-
cent human person has the moral right to con-
tinue living” and the rule “Any woman has the
moral right to control her own internal repro-
ductive activities.” But the debates typically fo-
cus on how these rules  should be  interpreted,
what qualifications, if any, should limit their ap-
plication,  and which of  these  conflicting rules
carries  the  greater  authority.  Ultimately,  as
both sides of the debate usually agree, the issue
boils down to whether or not the fertilized egg
and/or the early fetus that develops therefrom
really is, or should be counted as, a human per-
son in the first place. The right-to-life folks say
“yes.” The defenders of choice say “no.”
Our point in rehearsing this issue is that,
even in the case of this most celebrated of moral
conflicts, the primary issue, once again, is not
really about rules. It is about how we should in-
terpret or categorize, rationally and accurately,
the early fetus. One side will argue, “It’s just a
clutch of unfolding stem cells, without a brain
or  nervous  system,  without  any  character  or
personal identity, without any will or conscious-
ness, without any of the dimensions of genuine
personhood. It is no more a person than a re-
cently-planted  acorn  is  already  an  oak  tree.”
The other side will argue, “Personhood begins
at  conception,  at  fertilization.  That  is  when
God places a human soul into the now-develop-
ing egg. Accordingly, that is when the right to
life  begins,  a  right  not  to  be  subsequently
denied. (And by the way, acorns don’t have im-
material souls.)” 
The first side will respond, “We don’t ac-
cept your utterly unverified theory of immater-
ial souls implanted by a divine being at concep-
tion, and we resist your attempt to thus impose
your  arbitrary  and fantastical  religious  beliefs
on the rest of us. (And by the way, modern sci-
ence implies that humans don’t have immaterial
souls  either.)”  To  which  the  second  side  will
counter,  “Your position acknowledges  no clear
or  well-defined  point  at  which  the  developing
fetus begins to acquire rights. If it is acceptable
to  terminate  the  life  of  the  developing  fetus,
why isn’t it acceptable to terminate the life of a
developing  newborn baby?  That  would  plainly
be over the top, but the case of a fetus is differ-
ent in no fundamental respect.” 
And so it  goes.  Each side of  the debate
typically attempts to get the other side to see
the problematic case “in a different light,” to in-
terpret it as relevantly similar to a distinct but
salient prototype whose moral status is not un-
der dispute, to assimilate it to a category that
is factually more adequate to the problematic
case  at  hand.  Thus  the  category  “mindless
clutch of cells” vies with the category “innocent
and defenseless person” for our cognitive appre-
hension of the conceptus and early fetus. Argu-
ments here are not conducted by repeatedly cit-
ing  moral  rules  and  deducing  consequences
therefrom. They are conducted by repeated at-
tempts to highlight diverse factual similarities,
and dissimilarities, between each of the contest-
ing moral prototypes, on the one hand, and the
conceptus/early fetus on the other. 
I deploy this example of a moral disagree-
ment and its  typical  discussion not  to try  to
settle the issue in favor of either side here, but
to illustrate the forms that moral disagreements
and  moral  arguments  typically  display.  It  is,
most assuredly,  not the aim of this naturalistic
and brain-focused essay to try to deduce any
substantive moral rules from our growing under-
standing of  how the brain conducts  its  moral
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cognition. Brains arrive at their moral wisdom
by  a  long  process  of  learning,  often  painful
learning,  whether  in  the  lifetime  of  an  indi-
vidual or in the centuries-long development of a
society, and there is no substitute for this learn-
ing process. It is rather like the development of
scientific wisdom, if I may draw an optimistic
analogy. At present, we are also learning how
human brains engage in scientific cognition, but
that does not obviate the need for our scientific
communities  to  continue  to  generate  theories
and test them against our unfolding experience.
Knowing how the brain works so as to generate
and  constantly  improve  our  scientific  under-
standing will  not  obviate the  need to  keep it
working toward that worthy end, though it may
help us to improve our pursuit thereof. Simil-
arly, knowing  how the brain works to generate
and constantly improve our  moral understand-
ing will not obviate the need to keep it working
toward that worthy end, though it may help us
to improve our pursuit thereof. I will close on
this hopeful note. 
References
Campbell, M., Hoane, A. J. & Hsu, F.-H. (2002). Deep
blue. Artificial Intelligence, 134 (1-2), 57-83.
10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00129-1
Solomon,  R.  C.  (Ed.)  (2001).  Introducing  Philosophy.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Churchland, P. M. (2015). Rules: The Basis of Morality… ?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 6(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570139 13 | 13
